Using Property induction to evaluate understanding of mixing by Quinn, C et al.
Using Property Induction to Evaluate Understanding of Mixing  
 
Connor Quinn
1
 (cq209@cam.ac.uk) 
Michelle R. Ellefson
1
 (mre33@cam.ac.uk) 
Anne Schlottmann
2
 (a.schlottmann@ucl.ac.uk) 
Keith S. Taber
1
 (kst24@cam.ac.uk) 
1
Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge 
2
Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London 
 
 
Abstract 
 Although reasoning skills have been investigated in a number 
of different domains, very little is known about how children 
and adults use them in chemistry. Here, participants from 4 
years to adults saw various mixtures presented using a 
standard property induction paradigm. The category and 
appearance of everyday materials were varied to assess the 
extent that participants use these features to inform their 
judgments about what happens when these materials are 
mixed with water. In general, the results followed similar 
patterns seen when this paradigm has been applied to other 
domains, with both category and appearance informing 
inductive generalizations. The findings contrast with 
interview-based measures of children’s understanding of 
chemistry and offer an important addition to the field.  
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Background 
There is a growing consensus that children learn and 
reason about novel situations by basing their generalizations 
on their previous experiences (e.g., Wellman & Gelman, 
1998). Children have extensive experience of chemistry in 
their everyday world, e.g., baking or rusting. However, there 
are few studies in cognitive science exploring children’s 
reasoning about the chemical world. Here, we present a 
novel application of a property induction paradigm to 
investigate how primary school children (ages 4 to 11) 
reason about one basic chemical phenomenon - the mixing 
of different materials.
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1 The terms used in this paper are compatible with standard 
terminology used by chemists in technical writing. Items such as 
soap, coconut, or sugar are a mixture of substances and are not 
considered pure ‘substances’ by chemists. Instead, chemists refer 
to these items as ‘materials’. For simplicity, the term ‘materials’ is 
used here to refer to all items rather than having to distinguish 
between materials and substances. This terminology does not fit 
squarely within the typical cognitive science framework where 
‘substances’ might be used to indicate different categories and 
‘materials’ used to refer to the stimuli and props used in an 
experiment. In addition, when materials are added to water there 
may or may not be a chemical reaction, depending on the makeup 
of the materials involved. Therefore, we use the term ‘mixing’ to 
capture the process for all items, regardless of the chemical 
outcome of the mixing process. 
The focus of this study is mixing because it is one of the 
earliest chemical phenomena children are deemed capable of 
grasping (e.g., Au, Sidle, & Rollins, 1993; Johnson, 2000; 
Rosen & Rozin, 1993) and because very little work exists in 
this area (Çalýk, Ayas, & Ebenezer, 2005). Most of the few 
existing studies have used interviews. The results of these 
interviews suggest that young children attend almost 
exclusively to what they can see, i.e., the macroscopic 
properties of the materials (Arnold, Moye, & Winer, 1986; 
Ebenezer & Erikson, 1996; Haider & Abraham, 1991) and 
have little or no conception of the particulate nature of 
matter (Liu & Lesniak, 2006; Nakhleh & Samarapungavan, 
1999; Renström, Andersson, & Marton, 1990). Briefly, the 
particulate nature of matter refers to the idea that materials 
are made up of invisible, sub-microscopic particles, with 
molecules being the smallest particles of most materials. 
Some knowledge of the particulate nature of matter is 
necessary to understand materials and how they interact with 
each other; naïve (incomplete or incorrect) understanding of 
particles likely leads to misconceptions of chemical 
phenomena. The assumption is that because young children 
are not able to explain the particulate nature of matter or the 
microscopic properties of materials that they lack the ability 
to reason adequately about materials  
One issue with these findings is that the interview 
method relies on children having the appropriate language of 
chemistry to be able to explain the phenomena. As a result, 
it may be the case that children’s abilities in this area have 
been greatly underestimated. Extensive studies of naïve 
physics and naïve biology indicate that children’s reasoning 
abilities about these science phenomena surpass their 
abilities to explain them verbally. Tasks that are not reliant 
on verbal ability indicate that even infants have some 
understanding of physics (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). For 
example, infants know that solid objects cannot just 
appear/disappear or move through physical barriers (Spelke, 
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992), are distinct 
from one another (Xu & Carey, 1996), and once put into 
motion travel over distances related to the force of that 
motion (Kotovsky & Baillargeon, 1998). These tasks 
indicate young children do have some appreciation of the 
properties of materials; 3-year-olds know that wooden 
pillows are hard (Kalish & Gelman, 1992) and 4-year-olds 
know that material is conserved if the object is broken up 
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(e.g., a plastic toy taken apart is still plastic even if it no 
longer operates as a toy; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985). 
The success of these language-sparse experimental 
paradigms in uncovering the foundations of young 
children’s emerging understanding in naïve physics and 
biology might suggest that young children can make sense 
of chemical phenomena. Here, we use a language-sparse 
property induction paradigm to study early chemistry 
reasoning. Briefly, the property induction paradigm 
investigates how children use category and appearance 
information in their generalizations of natural kinds, 
typically biological kinds (Gelman & Markman, 1986; 
Gelman & Markman, 1987). For example, Farrar, Raney, & 
Boyer (1992) showed 5- to 10-year-old children a familiar 
target object with its familiar name (e.g., egg) and taught 
them a novel property about that object (e.g., ‘has 
mitochondria inside’). Next, children were asked whether 
the four test items below also had that novel property:  
1. Same category, same appearance (e.g., plain egg);  
2. Same category, different appearance (e.g., spotted egg);  
3. Different category, same appearance (e.g., snow ball);  
4. Different category, different appearance (e.g., leaf). 
At all ages, generalizations depended both on category 
and appearance, but how children relied on these cues 
changed with age. Pre-school children generalized more to 
objects in the same category with the same appearance than 
to the other items; in other words, they thought the typical 
cue correlation was necessary. Second graders generalized 
more to objects that matched in category and appearance 
than to objects matching in only one cue than to objects 
matching in neither cue; that is, they realize that category 
and appearance are separable predictors. Only fourth graders 
generalized more to same category, different appearance 
items than to different category, same appearance items, 
realizing that category was a better predictor than 
appearance. This mature pattern appeared even for second 
graders in a second study varying knowledge of the 
categories/properties in question, but only when children 
reasoned about known categories/properties. Generalization 
about materials may include more features than category and 
appearance. For example, 8-year-olds seem to generalize 
more often to items with matching causal information 
compared to perceptual features and 5-year-olds seem to be 
able to make use of causal information when it is not in 
competition with physical features (Hayes & Thompson, 
2007). This distinction may be relevant for chemistry where 
the causal factors that determine mixing outcomes may not 
correspond to perceptual features. The results from these 
property induction studies have indicated that children as 
young as 2 years are not limited to appearance-based 
reasoning when categories/properties are well known 
(Gelman & Coley, 1990), but variations in knowledge 
continue to play a vital role at older ages. 
Given the success of this paradigm in furthering the 
understanding of young children’s reasoning, it seems well 
suited as an application for the chemical phenomena 
investigated here – mixing. More specifically, do children 
generalize from one mixture outcome to another if the 
substances involved are of the same category or of the same 
appearance? How does this depend on age and on children’s 
knowledge of the substances involved? 
In contrast to studies of biological properties, 
generalization of mixture properties does not depend on 
category only, but on appearance as well. Mapping the 
category and appearance properties onto chemistry, it might 
be useful to think of categories in chemistry as relating to 
materials and appearances in chemistry as relating to forms 
like powder, granule or larger chunks. Whether different 
materials dissolve in water or not depends on a variety of 
factors related to molecular structure. For instance, water is 
polar and can break other polar or ionic materials like salt 
(NaCl) apart, but not non-polar or covalent materials like 
sand (SiO2); roughly, like dissolves like. How different 
forms of a material mix with water might depend on factors 
related to surface area. For instance, table salt (NaCl, in 
granular form) usually dissolves more quickly in water than 
rock salt (NaCl, in a large chunk) because it has a greater 
surface area. As such, in addition to examining the role of 
language in children’s reasoning about basic chemical 
phenomena, the current design allows for an investigation of 
whether children’s generalizations about chemical properties 
are similar to those in other domains. Specifically, will 
reasoning about chemistry follow both material (category) 
and form (appearance) cues in the same way as for biology, 
will there be a different pattern for chemistry, reflecting 
domain differences in cue efficacy, or will young children 
remain appearance-bound, as predicted by the findings from 
interview studies? 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 142 participants (Nfemale = 81) took part in this 
experiment. There were 122 children recruited from schools 
in eastern England, including 24 children from reception (M 
= 4.87 years, SD = 0.35, Nfemale = 11), 32 children from year 
two (M = 6.62 years, SD = 0.46, Nfemale = 19), 33 from year 
four (M = 8.60 years, SD = 0.41 Nfemale = 15) and 35 from 
year six (M = 10.74 years, SD = 0.28, Nfemale = 21). In 
addition, 20 adult participants were recruited from the 
university and local community (M = 26.45, SD = 6.70, 
Nfemale = 15). For simplicity, these different age groups are 
referred to here as 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds, 11-
year-olds, and adults. Adults were paid £10 for their 
participation and represented a range of chemistry 
experience. Children were invited to dress up as scientists 
for the duration of the study and were given stickers and 
their schools given a special science presentation by a local 
science outreach program. The participating schools were 
typical schools in terms of their range of student abilities 
and backgrounds according to publically available 
government data (www.ofsted.gov.uk).  
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Figure 1. An example of a target. The picture on the left 
shows the water and the target (e.g., granulated brown 
sugar) before mixing. The picture on the right shows the 
water and target after they were mixed. 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of a set of probes: (1) same 
material, same form (e.g., granulated brown sugar); (2) same 
material, different form (e.g., brown sugar cube); (3) 
different material, same form (e.g., sand); and (4) different 
material, different form (e.g., a pebble). 
 
Materials 
Everyday items (e.g., sugars, salts, sand, etc.) were 
selected as stimuli because children may reason better about 
familiar content and for safety reasons. Twelve sets of items 
were chosen, with each set including a target and four 
probes (see Table 1). The probes followed the conditions 
mentioned above: (1) same material, same form; (2) same 
material, different form; (3) different material, same form; 
and (4) different material, different form.  
Several constraints were imposed on the selection of the 
targets and probes based on pragmatics and the experimental 
design: (1) the target and probes were safe and appropriate 
for use with young children; (2) the target-probe pairs had 
similar appearances for their matching forms (solid, granule, 
or powder); and (3) the targets and probes were balanced in 
terms of their outcomes when mixed with water. When 
controlling for mixing outcomes it was noticed that long 
names, (e.g., antacid) were often associated with exciting 
outcomes such as fizzing. To avoid this possible confound 
some items were given alternative names
2
. Finally, the 
relative mass and volume of the targets and probes were as 
similar as possible so that these perceptual features would 
not act as additional cues to the outcomes. Transparent 
400mL plastic beakers (see Figure 1) were used to show the 
mixing of each target with water. The beakers were filled 
with 250mL of water and had lids to allow mixing of the 
targets with the water without risk of spillage. The probes 
were presented in transparent 140mL plastic containers (see 
Figure 2), sealed with clear plastic lids for safety. 
 
Procedures 
Participants sat opposite the experimenter at a table in a 
quiet area of their primary school or university. A clear 
plastic beaker with water was placed on the table and 
identified as water. A transparent plastic tub containing the 
target was displayed and identified for the participant, using 
the phrase “See this tub? This tub has [target name]. I’m 
going to mix the [target name] with the water.’  
All items were named for the participants. In order to 
ensure no cues about the type of material could be implied 
from the instructions, mass/count words were not used (e.g., 
“This is a vitamin.” or “This is some sugar.”). Instead, only 
general names were given (e.g., “This is vitamin.” or “This 
is sugar.”). The form of the target and probe were not 
mentioned. 
The target was added to the water, the beaker was sealed 
and it was turned upside down once to facilitate mixing. 
Participants were asked to describe what happened both to 
the target and to the water. This step ensured they were 
attending to the mixing.  
 
Table 1: List of Target and Probe Materials 
 
Target 
Form 
Target  
Material 
Probe  
Material 
Solid 
Chalk  Lolly  
Chocolate  Almond  
Vitamin  Sweet  
Paint  Incense  
Granule 
Peppercorns  Candy  
Bath Bomb  Wax  
Sugar  Stone  
Coffee  Stock cube  
Powder 
Coconut  Soap  
Antacid  Washing Soap  
Salt  Rice  
Kool-Aid  Play-Doh  
 
After mixing the target with water, the experimenter 
displayed and identified each of the four probes, one at a 
                                                     
2  Antacid became ‘meds’, bath bomb and washing powder 
became ‘stuff for the bath’ and ‘Stuff for the Wash’ respectively. 
Peppercorn was shortened to ‘pepper’, and stock cube was ‘stock’. 
‘lolly’ was a short stick of candy. 
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time in a pre-established randomized ordering. For each 
probe participants were asked if it would do the same as the 
target using the phrase 'See this tub? This tub has [probe 
name] in it. Do you think this would do the same as [target 
name] if I put it in water?’  
Participants were instructed to give “Yes” or “No” 
replies. Simplifying the required responses in this way was 
important in order to make the task accessible for the 
youngest participants. For the younger groups two sheets of 
paper were also available, green and red, with ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
written on them respectively. Children could point to these if 
they did not give a verbal response. Only one child made use 
of these sheets. If participants did not give a specific ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ response, the question was repeated to prompt a ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ answer. Sessions were video recorded so that replies 
could be verified and confirmed off-line.  
The target remained in view on the table mixed with the 
water while the participants saw the probes. After each of 
the four probes was presented, the target and water were 
cleared out of view before the next set of items was 
presented. 
There were 12 sets of items each containing a target to 
be mixed with water and four probes for a total of 48 trials. 
Both the order of the 12 sets and the order four probes 
within each set were presented pseudo-randomly. The 
youngest group always completed the study in two separate 
sessions. 
 
Results 
The proportion of “Yes” responses given by the 
participants to the probes were analyzed using a 5 × 2 × 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with the between-subjects 
factor of age group (5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds, 
11-year-olds, and adults) and the within-subjects factors of 
material (same vs. different from the target) and form (same 
vs. different from the target). This ANOVA was conducted 
using the restricted maximum likelihood technique (REML; 
Bagiella, Sloan, & Heitjan, 2000). There were no overall 
significant differences among the three forms (powder, 
granule, or solid), making it feasible to combine them 
together and focus the analyses on same vs. different form 
only. 
There was a significant effect of both material, F(1, 
139.1) = 445.44, p < .0001, and form, F(1, 139.2) = 418.56, 
p < .0001, as well as a significant interaction between 
material and form, F(1, 139.3) = 119.42, p < .0001 (See 
Figure 3). More specifically, participants responded ‘Yes” 
most often when the probe was the same material, and same 
form as the target (M = .96, SD = .21), followed by probes 
that were the same material and different form (M = .59, SD 
= .49), probes that were a different material and same form 
(M = .49, SD = .50), and probes that were a different 
material and different form (M = .30, SD = .46). Post-hoc 
tests using Tukey’s HSD indicated that each probe type was 
different from the others. 
 
 
Figure 3. The mean proportion of “Yes” responses made 
to the same and different materials and forms across all age 
groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The mean proportion of “Yes” responses made to 
the same and different materials and forms by each age 
group. 
 
The main effect of age group was not significant, F(4, 
139.1) = 0.89, p = .47. Similarly, age group did not interact 
significantly with material, F(4, 139.1) = 2.03, p = .09, 
form, F(4, 139.1) = 1.15, p = .34, or material and form 
combined, F(4, 139.2) = 1.53, p = .20 (see Figure 4). 
 
Discussion 
This paper presents a novel adaptation of the property 
induction paradigm to explore how children reason about the 
chemical process of mixing. The design was created in order 
to use language-sparse methods as a way of further 
examining children’s reasoning in this domain by addressing 
whether: (1) young children display a better understanding 
of mixing processes when assessed using a language-sparse 
method compared to interviews; and (2) whether children 
differentially attend to the category (material) or appearance 
(form) of materials when generalizing about mixing. 
In terms of the first question, the results confirm that 
young children’s reasoning about these materials does not 
differ from older children and adults in terms of mixing in 
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this context. These findings are consistent with other 
property induction studies, but are contrary to the results of 
interview studies (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman & 
Markman, 1987; Liu & Lesniak, 2006; Au, Sidle, & Rollins, 
1993). As such, there is some indication that this type of 
language-sparse methodology might be useful in further 
exploring how young children reason about other chemical 
phenomena. 
In relation to the second question, participants of all age 
groups attend to category and appearance when making 
generalizations about mixing. The presence of this finding 
for the youngest age group suggests that even young 
children bring their everyday reasoning skills to 
understanding chemistry despite not yet being able to 
articulate sophisticated explanations. The findings presented 
here replicate the overall pattern found with property 
induction studies in other domains (e.g., Gelman & 
Markman, 1987). Specifically, the category seems to have 
more influence than appearance on the generalizations that 
were made.  
However, these findings are distinctive to property 
induction studies in other areas. Specifically, this study did 
not replicate the common finding of age related differences 
in the use of category and appearance. In a chemistry 
context like that presented here, both features seem to be 
influencing generalizations, whereas in other studies from 
the domain of biology the categorical information becomes 
more important for generalizations in older children than 
younger children (e.g., Farrar et al., 1992).  
One explanation for the discrepancy between the results 
found here and other property induction studies might be 
that this task used naturalistic materials and actual mixing 
events, whereas most of the previous studies used pictures, 
words or text (Farrar et al., 1992; Gelman & Coley, 1990; 
Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman & Markman, 1987; 
Hayes & Thompson, 2007). More specifically, these 
previous studies mostly frequently used artificially selected 
stimuli with a constrained set of properties that allowed for a 
limited number of inductions, whereas the materials used 
here are more ecologically valid but they do include a wider 
variety of properties and more possible inductions.  
Using real materials might have inadvertently allowed 
participants to attend to properties other than the category 
and appearance properties explicitly examined here (e.g., the 
density of objects could have been assumed by participants 
to have played a role in the outcome). In contrast, when 
experimental stimuli are created to vary only on a limited set 
of properties, then participants may base their 
generalizations more on the specific properties for which 
these artificial stimuli were designed to control. Thus, the 
inherent complexity of real-world materials might have 
prevented well-controlled and systematic studies of 
reasoning about chemistry. This language-sparse design 
provides a platform from which additional studies might be 
developed that control for the wide variety of features that 
may play a role when natural stimuli are used in property 
induction studies, while still being more ecologically valid. 
It may be the case that children exploit multiple redundant 
cues in their natural environment, so the pattern found here 
may be indicative of their reasoning in their everyday lives.  
Another reason for this finding in chemistry, but not 
biology might be due to domain-specific differences in the 
way chemistry information is processed. It could be the case 
that reasoning skills are applied differently in the biological 
and chemical contexts because the features that help in 
terms of generalization have different predictive validity.  
In chemistry, appearance might be both an unreliable 
predictor and necessary for making a prediction. Firstly, 
appearance alone is generally an unreliable predictor of 
category. For example, white powder can be any number of 
different materials with a wide range of possible chemical 
properties. Secondly, it is difficult to make a prediction 
about the outcome based on the knowledge of the category 
without information about appearance. For example, 
aluminum is inert as a solid block, but easily combusts in 
powdered form. In contrast, in biology, appearance might be 
a reliable predictor of behavior when it predicts category 
membership (e.g., wings might predict bird and flying).  
Most property induction studies introduce unreliable 
correlations amongst features like appearance and category 
and assuming that biology naturally includes more reliable 
correlations amongst these features, then it could be the case 
that property induction studies introduce unnatural reasoning 
settings. As such, the age difference apparent in biology 
generalizations may reflect children’s growing 
understanding of what to do when the correlations they 
experience in their everyday lives are broken by our 
experimental designs in property induction. On the other 
hand, in chemistry, the correlations are naturally unreliable, 
matching the usual property induction design. Thus, the 
property induction paradigm might be more representative 
of naturalistic reasoning in chemistry but not biology. If that 
were the case, then the more mature reasoning seen in this 
chemistry context might be related to the match between the 
experimental design and children’s everyday experiences 
rather than the differences inherent to reasoning about 
biology and chemistry. 
This aspect of chemistry raises an intriguing perspective 
on development of categorization and reasoning skills. 
Cognitive science includes a large body of studies 
investigating the basic building blocks of cognition with 
which children learn about the world. In physics, biology, 
and psychology evidence has suggested that children 
generalize existing knowledge to extend their ability to 
reason about the world. A debate remains about the origins 
of these basic reasoning skills. Most areas of reasoning 
struggle to separate the question of how much of reasoning 
is dependent upon domain-specific experiences and how 
much is due to domain-general strategies. Chemistry may 
offer a unique perspective for this debate. Like physics, 
biology, and psychology, children are exposed to chemical 
phenomena throughout childhood, but the differences 
between these domains in terms of predictive validity of 
features might provide a new direction for further study. 
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If it is indeed the case that children are sensitive to the 
idea that different cues are meaningful in biology versus 
chemistry, then it could be the case that children are 
bringing very sophisticated reasoning skills to their attempts 
to understand chemistry. However, this is the first study in 
this area and other relevant cues (e.g., density, naming, etc.) 
should to be explored before firm conclusions can be made. 
In sum, this novel application of the property induction 
paradigm to chemistry raises important questions about the 
development of reasoning skills in chemistry and further 
offers directions of research to address key questions of how 
children learn to reason about the world. The question of 
how abstract reasoning skills develop is a core issue for 
education. Previous research into young children’s 
understanding of chemistry has relied upon language-based 
measures. This study offers a more sensitive measure of 
chemistry reasoning that is not constrained by a child’s 
language development. The findings presented here might 
be useful in re-evaluating the assumptions that educators 
make about the reasoning skills children bring to chemistry 
learning and could be applied to develop more effective 
ways of learning for chemistry students of all ages.  
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